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Abstract 
Alexander Hamilton was a major protagonist in the struggle to build a strong national 
government backed by the powers necessary to wield centralized power. Hamilton's 
political and economic writings are complementary bodies of work since they both have 
common ends - the development of a strong national government and the establishment of 
strong political-economic institutions. The complementary nature of Hamilton's political 
and economic writings are most apparent in his defense of the proposal to found a new 
national bank. This paper will examine in depth Hamilton's writings, concentrating on 
the bank proposal. The development of this strong and stable financial institution would 
play both political and economic roles in the new republic. In particular, the national 
bank would institutionalize citizen support for the new government and thereby ensure 
the longer-term stability and strength of the national government. 
The force of moneyed capital, which has been displayed in Great Britain, 
and the height to which every species of industry has grown up under it, 
defy a solution, from the quantity of coin which that kingdom has ever pos­
sessed. Accordingly, it has been, coeval with its funding system, the prevailing 
opinion of men of business, and of the generality of the most sagacious the­
orists of that country, that the operation of the public funds, as capital, has 
contributed to the effect in question. Among ourselves, appearances, thus 
far, favor the same conclusion. Industry, in general, seems to have been re­
animated. There are symptoms indicating an extension of our commerce. 
Our navigation has certainly, of late, had a considerable spring; and there 
appears to be, in many parts of the Union, a command of capital, which till 
lately, since the Revolution, at least, was unknown . . . But, though a funded 
debt is not, in the first instance, an absolute increase of capital, or an aug­
mentation of real wealth; yet, by serving as a new power in the operations of 
industry, it has, within certain bounds, a tendency to increase the real wealth 
of a community, in like manner, as money, borrowed by a thrifty farmer . 
adds to his stock of real riches.1 
Alexander Hamilton 
1 Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton. Edited by John C. Hamilton. (New York: 
John F. Trow, 1850. Volume 3, p. 231.) This volume will hereafter be cited as Hamilton, V. 3. The 
fourth volume in this series will be cited as Hamilton, V. 4. 
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Alexander Hamilton closed the Federalist Papers with a dire warning: "A NATION, 
without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is in my view, an awful spectacle . . .  I dread 
the consequences of new attempts because I know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in 
this and in other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possi­
ble shape." 1 In these words lies the motivations for the thoughts and deeds of Hamilton, 
ranging from his participation in the Constitutional Convention to his participation in the 
Washington Administration. Throughout this period, Hamilton was a major protagonist 
in the struggle to build a strong national government, backed by the powers necessary 
to wield centralized power. Further, in his role as Treasury Secretary, Hamilton worked 
under controversy first to place the new national government on a strong financial foun­
dation and second to develop the necessary financial institutions to establish and increase 
the economic power of the new United States. 
Hamilton's political and his economic writings are not distinct and separate bodies 
of work but are instead complementary. If viewed as a whole it is clear that they have 
common ends-the development of a strong national government and the establishment 
of stable and lasting political-economic institutions. This paper will trace the comple­
mentary nature of Hamilton's political and economic thought with particular reference 
to the national bank. To do so, we will first examine Hamilton's political thought in 
the Federalist Papers and his lengthy speech at the Federal Convention. We will turn 
to his economic thought, examining the national debt crisis, Hamilton's proposed solu­
tions, and the political-economic ramifications of Hamilton's "system." There we will see 
the political obstacles confronting these proposals in Congress and in the Administra­
tion, specifically the constitutional controversy over Hamilton's bank proposal. Last, we 
will tie these threads 'fogether and di,scuss the themes underlying Hamilfon's "political 
economy. " 
*I would like to thank John Aldrich, Robert Bates, Ruth Grant, and Sarah Hamm-Alvarez for their 
advice and especially for their patience. 
1 Alexander Hamilton, et al. The Federalist Papers. (New York: New American Library, 1961), No. 
85, p. 527. Hereafter cited as Hamilton, Federalist Papers. 
1 Hamilton's Political Thought 
There are three themes in Hamilton's political writings: gaining and increasing popular 
support for t)le national government, the necessity of centralized national government, 
and providing the national government with the powers required to carry out its stated 
ends. We will examine each theme. 
The first theme was Hamilton's concern with developing and increasing popular sup­
port for the new national government. During his June 18, 1787 speech to the Federal 
Convention, Hamilton· discussed the possibility of a strong and lasting national govern­
ment. He stated, "To ascertain the practicability of this let us examine the principles of 
civil obedience." 2 Hamilton listed as these principles of governmental support the interest 
to support it, the opinion of its utility and necessity, the development of a habitual sense 
of obligation, the use of force, and the use of in:B.uence.3 
The first principle-interest-was discussed as a tension between state and national 
government. Hamilton knew that the states, as more immediate forms of government 
to the populace, had an easier time retaining the loyalty of their citizens. As long as 
the existing political system remained the states would follow the recent example of New 
York: " (the) New York legislature made an external compliance lately to a requisition
of Congress; but do they not at the same time counteract this compliance by gratifying 
the local objects of the states so as to defeat their concession."4 It was clear to Hamilton 
that the national government would have to obtain the direct loyalty of the people by 
appealing to their short-term and immediate interests in the manner of the states. 
The second principle involved the development of positive opinions on the utility 
and necessity of the national government. It was clear to Hamilton that the centralized 
government would have to quickly and coherently demonstrate to the people that they 
needed such government. He stated that while the dissolution of the states would be a 
fatal blow to confederation, a similar dissolution of the confederation "would still leave 
the purposes of Gov't attainable to a considerable degree."5 
The third principle, a habitual sense of obligation, favored the state governments. 
The latter were more immediately important to the people, and at that time the ends 
the people desired from the government-protection and justice-came from the states. 
This habitual obligation would arise only when the national government became directly 
relevant to the populace for a lengthy period of time, so that people would support the 
national government out of habit. 
2Max Farrand;Editor:-"'The ''Records ol the Federal Convention. {New Haven: 'Yale University Press,
1966). v. 1, p. 305.
3Note: in Farrand's volume of the debates at the Convention, Hamilton's speech was written down 
by Hamilton in the form of notes, and by Madison and Yeats in a longer fashion. When I discuss
Hamilton's ideas from this speech, I am working directly off Hamilton's notes where possible and then
using Madison and Yeats for accurate interpretation. 
4Farrand, V.l, p. 295. Quotation from Yeats. 
5Farrand, V. 1, p. 284, Madison. 
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The fourth principle, force, was also tipped toward the state governments: "Force by 
which may be understood a coercion of laws or coercion of arms. . . Congress has not 
the former except in a few cases." 6 Without either the force of laws or the force of arms, 
Hamilton thought the national government would be crippled from the outset. It would 
be impossible for the national government to enforce its decrees or act in its own interest 
without reliance on the state governments for coercive assistance. As the Revolutionary 
War demonstrated, the state governments tended to assist the national government only 
when it was clearly in their short-term interests to provide such assistance; when it was 
not in their interests, the state governments ignored or gave only slightly assistance to 
the national government. Without both powers of coercion Hamilton understood there 
was no way the national government could coerce or sanction dissenting states, enforce 
its decrees, or prevent the intervention of foreign nations in the relations between the 
states. 
The last principle was influence. By influence Hamilton did not mean corruption 
but a subtler form of patronage- "a dispensation of those regular honors and emouluents, 
which produce an attachment to the Gov't." 7 The central government, to gain popular 
support, had to maintain connections to the citizens based on those very aspects of their 
personal preferences which motivated them to support the state governments: ambition, 
self-interest, avarice. 
As we have noted, each of these principles of government support was tipped in the 
favor of the states at the time of the Federal Convention. But could these scales be 
tipped toward the new national government? At the Convention, Hamilton laid out his 
own plan for the national government: 
What is the inference from 211 these observations? That we ought to go as 
far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will 
admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least 
during good behavior. Let the Executive also be for life . . .  On this plan we 
should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would 
answer essential purposes." 8 
This proposal-containing a virtual "elected monarch" and an obvious parallel to the 
British system-had little impact at the Convention, but was important in later criti­
cisms of Hamilton. 9 The importance of this proposed system, however, is Hamilton's 
concern with building �table and_permanentpoliticali nstitutions which would mitigate 
"the amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit." 1 0  These institutions 
6Farrand, V. 1, p. 284, Madison. 
7Farrand, V. 1, p. 285, Madison. 
8Farrand, V.l: 289-290, Madison. 
9Forrest McDonald. Alexander Hamilton: A Biography. (New York: I.W. Norton and Company, 
1974), p. 104. Hereafter cited as McDonald. 
1°Farrand, V. 1, p. 289, Madison. 
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would establish and increase popular support for the government, while attending to 
the short-term interests of the populace. They would be crucial in the development of 
habitual obligation between citizens and the central government. 
The second theme in Hamilton's political thought was his exposition (Federalist Pa­
pers, Numbers 6-9, 11-13) on the necessity of the union. While in his earlier speeches 
and writings he emphasized the shape of the new government and the development of 
popular support, his writings during the ratification period elaborated the need for a 
strong central government. Hamilton centered on two distinct themes: the safeguard 
against dissension both within and between states and the economic benefits of union. 
To highlight the means by which the Union would eliminate dissension between the 
States, Hamilton discussed the causes of hostility between nations: first, "are the love of 
power or the desire of pre-eminence and domination " ;  second "are the rivalships and com­
petitions of commerce between commercial nations" ;  and third "are the others . .. which 
take their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interest, hopes, 
and fears of leading individuals." 1 1  The historical causes of hostility between nations 
Hamilton translated into the probable causes of conflicts between the states. He discussed 
the pro bl em of territorial disputes (especially the opening of Western lands) , commercial 
competition, the public debt, laws concerning the violations of private contracts, and the 
entanglements of European poli tics.1 2 
Hamilton's solution to this problem was summed up in this quote from the Abbe de 
Mably: 
NEIGHBORING NATIONS are naturally ENEMIES of each other, unless 
their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE RE­
PUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood 
occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to ag­
grandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors.13 
Why does Hamilton rely upon this quote for his solution to the problem of state dissen­
sion? If we return to the probable sources of inter-state conflict, these clearly are conflicts 
where states would "aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors." To elimi­
nate the incentives for states to press such claims and conflicts on on other states, they 
must be drawn into a cooperative system. The vehicle is the union, which will eliminate 
"the differences that neighborhood occasions." ... For example, states would not be able 
to press individualistiC"'demarids.for western lands:_all such lands would be controlled by 
the national government. Further, the national government would establish a system of 
tariffs and duties, eliminating inter-state conflict over commercial matters. Thus, the 
1 1  Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 6, p. 54. 
12Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 7. 
13Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 6, pp. 59-60. 
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Union would eliminate state dissension by removing the causes of individualistic conflict 
among the states. 
How would the Union stop intra-state faction or conflict? The problem of faction, 
noted Hamilton, would be countered by the institutional design of the proposed govern­
ment (separation of powers) and by the "enlargement of the sphere " argument, both later 
discussed by Madison. The problem of conflict or revolt, however, led Hamilton into a 
discussion of Montesquieu, who Hamilton paraphrased: 
Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, th� 
others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are re­
formed by those that remain sound .... As this government is composed cf 
small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to 
its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the 
advantages of larger monarchies.1 4 
The reliance on Montesquieu, while an excellent rhetorical device against those who ad­
vanced Montesquieu's arguments as evidence that the union will not work, led Hamilton 
to distinguish between a confederation and a consolidation. He argued that as long as 
the states maintain separate arid distinct organizations under the constitution, the union 
was actually a confederacy. 
Therefore, with this confederacy of many constituent parts, a "law of large numbers " 
holds. With multiple, separate elements-the states-the probability that insurrection 
would occur simultaneously in more than one state would be minimized. The union 
would quell tendencies toward insurrection since "sound " states would remain which 
would be be willing to defeat revolts to protect themselves and the "advantages " of their 
union. 
The union, in Hamilton's thought, was also essential for economic expansion and 
growth: "The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about 
which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion. " 1 5  The union would enhance 
commerce, increase government revenues, and lead to substantial scales of economy. 
As to the effect of the union on commerce, Hamilton was concerned with two distinct 
possibilities: the apprehension of the European powers about American economic growth 
and the problems of commerce between the states. 
The European powers, 'thoughtlia'm.itton; had' the'intentive to intervene in the devel­
opment of an American union in order to foment divisions between the states, or between 
the states and the national government: "this would answer the threefold purpose of pre­
venting our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, 
14Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 9, p. 75. 
15Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 1 1 , p. 84. 
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and of clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness." 1 6  A firm 
union, however, would fight these European designs by forcing them to bid for access to 
American markets and thus putting the European powers into conflict with each other; 
this competition would also open European markets to American goods. Further, the 
strong central government would be able to establish a strong navy which no individual 
state could construct independently. This navy would protect American commerce and 
open new markets for trade. By these means, the union would allow American commerce 
to expand and grow, thus advancing the American economy and international position. 
The union would also expand the commercial exchange between the states: 
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the 
trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only 
for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign 
markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished and will 
acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities 
of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from the 
diversity in the productions of different States. 1 7  
Thus in both these ways, the union of political interests will promote the union of com­
mercial interests.1 8 
Moreover, the firm union would also promote increased governmental revenues. First, 
with the increase in commerce, both domestic and foreign, there would be an increase in 
both capital in the nation to be taxed and quantity of money in circulation with which 
these taxes can be paid. But, as Hamilton knew (especially after Shay's Rebellion) , 
the people of the country would resist direct taxation; in the foreseeable future the 
government must therefore rely on the collection of duties and tariffs. Hamilton showed, 
however: "It is therefore evident. that one national government would be able at much 
less expense to extend the duties on imports beyond comparison, further than would be 
practicable to the States separately, or to any partial confederacies." 1 9  
Last, the union would entail substantial economies of scale, and would thus result 
in substantial savings to the various states. There would be only one national civil list 
to support; the protection or commerce and the detection of illegal trading would be 
subject to an economy of scale; also, the development of military forces would be easier 
and cheaper by one national government than s�parate efforts by the various states. 
*'. ' 
., 
The third theme of Hamilton's political thought was his emphasis on the powers 
necessary to institute and maintain a strong republic. The first step in discerning what 
16Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 1 1 , p. 85. 
1 7Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 11 ,  p. 89. 
1 8Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 1 1 ,  p. 90. 
1 9Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 12, p. 95. 
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powers the national government would need was deciding which objects the national 
government was designed to pursue: 
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead 
of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the essential point 
which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the OBJECTS, as 
far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or 
departments of power; allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling 
the objects committed to its charge.20 
Therefore the national government should have requisite powers to fulfill the fundamental 
ends for which it would be organized. In Hamilton's words, "the means ought to be 
proportional to the end; the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is 
expected ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained." 21 
What were the fundamental ends? Hamilton listed common defense, public peace, reg­
ulation of international and inter-state commerce, and foreign policy. Of these, Hamilton 
devoted most of Federalist No. 23 to discussing common defense. His conclusion concern­
ing common defense was that the national government needed unlimited means to fulfill 
the role of national defense due to the uncertainty which Hamilton surrounded such af­
fairs. Yet Hamilton did not stop with only national defense: while he built the argument 
for the means-end relationship on the least controversial aspect of centralized government 
power, he firmly believed that requisite powers (the means) should be extended to the 
national government for each explicitly-stated end. 
In Federalist No. 23, Hamilton extended the means-end relationship to internal and 
external threats and the promotion of commerce. But he initially neglected to discuss 
revenue collection, since this was a controversial topic. Under the Articles of Confed­
eration, the Congress had minimal means by which to raise revenues. They had to 
make requisitions against the states, which the states were bound to fulfill; yet during 
the course of the Revolution these requisitions had often gone ignored. It was clear to 
Hamilton that this was a necessary end of the new union: 
A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of 
revenue, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded 
as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this 
particular, one oftwo evils must ensue: either the people must be subjected 
to continual plunder ... or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy.22 
20Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 23, p. 155. 
21 Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 23, p. 153. 
22Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 30, p. 188. 
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Thus to avoid atrophy or plunder, the union must possess independent revenue-collection 
abilities. 
It is not surprising that Hamilton also extended his means-end relationship to the 
question of revenue collections, given the undesirable results a lack of such powers could 
entail. He bluntly stated that "the federal government must of necessity be invested with 
an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes." 23 By this Hamilton meant that 
the union must be granted unlimited powers to tax-both indirect and direct taxation. 
Unlimited revenue collection powers were required to insure future revenues for unknown 
future contingencies, especially those associated with national defense and wars.24 Un­
limited access to all taxation instruments was required to reduce the likelihood that any 
potential taxable activity would not be taxed so highly as to eliminate it or reduce it to 
an inefficient or undesirable existence. For if the national government were limited only 
to one instrument of taxation, like taxes on manufactures, the revenue requirements of 
the union could require taxing the fledgling manufacturing base of the republic out of 
existence or into an inefficient competitive existence. 
The problem with the unlimited extension of revenue collection powers, however, was 
the revenue requirements of each state. As Hamilton pointed out, the only source of 
revenue the union would acquire from the states was the power to tax imports. On all 
other potential sources of revenue the states retained their sovereign taxation powers. 
Hamilton did not believe that overlapping powers of taxation would be a burden on the 
people or the commerce of the new republic: "in a short course of time the wants of the 
States will naturally reduce themselves within a very narrow compass; and in the interim, 
the United States will in all probability find it convenient to abstain wholly from those 
objects to which the particular States would be inclined to resort." 25 
To summarize this discussion, we have seen Hamilton's political thought as comprising 
three themes: the principles necessary to build support for a national government; the 
reasons for a national government; and the necessary powers with which the national 
government should be endowed. These three strands, then are woven into the fabric 
which expressed Hamilton's vision of the national government: a strong, centralized 
government with the needed powers and popular support to propel the nation to achieve 
the greatness which Hamilton knew was possible. 
2 Hamilton's Economic Thought 
Yet immediately after the Constitution was ratifieu and the fi:rsCCongress prepared 
to meet, Hamilton's political vision seemed illusory. For Hamilton, the new Treasury 
Secretary, faced the forbidding task of reconstructing the war-torn national economy and 
establishing the national government's role in the current and future national economy. 
23Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 31 , p. 195. 
24Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 34, pp. 208-209. 
25Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 34, pp. 206-207. 
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To examine these two tasks, and how they meshed with Hamilton's political thought, we 
must turn to the political- economic crisis facing the new Union and the set of economic 
proposals Hamilton sent to Congress. We will concentrate on Hamilton's bank proposal 
since it stands at a crucial intersection in Hamilton's political and economic thought. 
The roots of this economic crisis lay in the Revolutionary War, and extend back into 
the colonial era. During the colonial and Confederation periods, both the states and the 
small national government faced serious difficulties in raising revenues since pre- Revolu­
tionary America possessed little liquid wealth. When war broke out in 1775, a means to 
finance the war effort by both the national and state governments was needed, given the 
lack of liquid wealth. Both state and national governments turned to two alternatives, 
printing paper money and loans. The Continental Congress, however, pledged the faith 
of the thirteen colonies to its (money's) redemption. Each colony was made responsible 
for the withdrawal of a certain share or quota of the total emission." 26 By war's end the 
Congress had printed a face value of over $200 million, an amount of paper currency 
roughly equal to the real price advances during the war which would have absorbed the 
currency without inflation or devaluation.27 
The problem was that the states had also printed roughly the same amount of paper 
money. This doubled the amount of currency in circulation, and the real value of the 
Continental currency rapidly fell. By 1779 this currency traded officially at a ratio of one 
1775 dollar to forty 1779 dollars and unofficially at a rate of one 1775 dollar to ninety eight 
1779 dollars in the New York security markets. Thus both the national government and 
the state governments (who originally were to have paid off the Continental Congress's 
debt) had printed their way into an inflationary spiral. 
Compounding the currency problem was the debt problem. The 17 Continental 
Congress had also issued loan certificates during the war, mostly at six percent inter­
est. Given inflation and devaluation, the interest on these certificates could not be met 
so the Continental Congress issued interest certificates, "indents " ,  which Congress then 
allowed the states to use as pledges against their annual requisitions to the war effort. Yet 
a few states-New York and Pennsylvania for instance-allowed their citizens to pay their 
state taxes with these certificates making these states large creditors of the national gov­
ernment since they held roughly one- third of all loan certificates. Also, the foreign debt 
totalled nearly $11 million at war's end, which cost Congress roughly a million dollars 
each year in interest and capital payments. The payments on the foreign debt, agreed 
upon in Congress as the top post-war priority, ate up all of the national government's 
revenues from their sole existing tax, the 1789 tariff. 
This economic crisis posed both short- and long-term economic problems for the new 
union. The virtual worthlessness of the various state and national currencies combined 
with a post-war flood of European imports to create a serious economic depression: 
26E. James Ferguson. The Power of the Purse. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1961), p. 76. Hereafter cited as Ferguson. 
27Ferguson, p. 26. 
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The hard times of the 1780's were indeed a depression, for prices became 
severely depressed. Beginning in mid-1784, wholesale commodity prices at 
Charleston, Philadelphia, and New York started to fall, and-with the excep­
tion of an upsurge at Charleston in 1796-followed a downward trend until 
1788 or mid-1789.28 
Thus in the short-run, the new nation faced a worthless currency system, a severely 
depressed economy, and virtually no economic growth. 
Another short-run economic problem was speculation in the debt. 
It is reasonably certain that by 1787 or 1788 the greater part of the debt not 
already redeemed by the states was in the possession of secondary holders of 
varying magnitude. It was the property of former army officers, shopkeepers, 
lawyers, and other professional men, prosperous landowners, merchants who 
traded in securities as an adjunct to commerce, (and) merchants who became 
security brokers. 29 
Above, we saw that in a few short years the values of the Continental currency had 
skyrocketed. There were booming security markets located in New York and Philadel­
phia which witnessed massive increases in the quantity of securities sold and prices of 
securities in the post-war years. The fact that wealthy men traded in government se­
curities and profited from these skyrocketing capital markets added to the downward 
spiral of the national economy and sparked popular controversy. On the economic side, 
these booming capital markets deepened the depression by fueling price increases and by 
adding to inflationary expectations. On the political side, pressures to stop speculation 
escalated on the lawmakers, since many felt that these "speculators " were profiting un­
fairly on securities the original holders-those who had invested in the patriotic cause of 
the Revolution-had sold merely to survive. 
Beyond the immediate political pressures that the issue of speculation in securities 
provoked, there also were two more general political problems which facing Hamilton. 
First, the economic debts of the national government threatened to widen the sectional 
split in the nation. On one hand, there was the problem of debt documentation in the 
states which held portions of the national debt: "Every state 19 in the union had difficulty 
arranging its accounts and supporting claims with documents, but the financial records 
of Virginia, North Carolina, and, apparently, Georgia were so fragmentary and confused 
as to defy organization." 30 On the other hand, the public debt was unequally distributed 
among the states: New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland held a third of the principal 
28Curtis D. Nettles. The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775-1815. (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1962), p. 62. Hereafter cited as Nettles. 
29Ferguson, p. 255. 
3°Ferguson, p. 215. 
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of the debt, while New England and the South held virtually none of the debt. Therefore 
the interests of the states were split over the public debt; any steps taken to eliminate 
the debt would face serious sectional opposition. 
The other political issue was how would the national government actually pay the 
debt. It was clear by the beginning of the first Washington administration that direct 
taxes would not work. Shay's Rebellion in 1786 was motivated by the heavy taxes 
Massachusetts had imposed on its citizens to fund its extensive war debt: "The cause of 
this insurrection was the oppression under which the citizens groaned, form the imposition 
of taxes to satisfy the public creditors." 31 Since direct taxes were not an option, other 
less "oppressive " means to fund the public debt would have to be formulated. 
In the long-term, the new republic faced an entirely different set of potential problems 
concerning the national debt-fostering economic growth, developing investment, build­
ing public confidence, and establishing the credibility of the new national government's 
role in economic development. The first long-term problem, the relationship between 
the economic crisis and economic growth, was straightforward. Unless the public debt 
was brought under control, the economic crisis would continue and perhaps worsen: as 
long as depression ensued, future economic growth would be less likely. The second 
long-term problem, investment, was tied to economic growth: as long as the crisis con­
tinued, further investment would decrease due to diminishing capital to be invested and 
to the heightened attractiveness of shorter-term domestic investment alternatives. Fur­
thermore, as economic growth diminished, the pool of capital available for investment 
would diminish. The dynamic relationship between growth and investment were the 
long-term consequences of the public debt and the economic depression. 
The third long-term problem concerned the credibility of, and confidence in the na­
tional government's ability to pay its debts and to positively influence economic devel­
opment. As Hamilton wrote: 
Every breach of the public engagements, whether from choice of necessity, is, 
in different degrees, hurtful to public credit ... with every possible mitigation, 
credit must suffer, and numerous mischiefs ensue.32 
Before the war, it was a common practice for state legislators to set aside their contrac­
tually obligated debts when they discovered that they would not be able to pay them.33 
This sort of behavior by the new national gove.rnment regarding the public debt would 
have deleteri.ous effects"on''the national governm'ent)s reputation as a creditor. As the 
national government repudiated its debts, those who held the repudiated debts would 
be hesitant to loan money to the government in the future, and would do so only at 
31 Annals, V. 1 1 , p. 133; Ferguson, pp. 245-248. 
32Hamilton, V. 3, p. 3. 
33McDonald, p. 1 19. Forrest McDonald, We The People. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962). 
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extremely high interest. Therefore, the issue of the national government's credit and 
credibility was at stake. 
Given what we know of Hamilton's political thought, and given these short- and 
long-term economic problems facing the new republic (which would act as restraints 
on the policy proposals Hamilton could advance) , what political-economic solutions did 
the new Secretary of the Treasury to formulate? Again it is illuminating to separate his 
proposed solutions to the economic crisis into short- and long-term proposals. The short­
term,-immediate solutions-assumption of state debts, funding, and the sinking fund-were 
submitted by Hamilton to the House during the First Congress. Once these immediate 
solutions were in effect, Hamilton turned to long-term solutions which he submitted to 
the House during the Second Congress. This set of proposals aimed to institutionalize 
the foundations for a solid and lasting system of public finance: the creation of a new 
national bank, a mint, and a taxation system. To elucidate Hamilton's economic thought, 
then, we will examine Hamilton's proposals to the first two Congresses. 
In January, 1790, Hamilton submitted his first report to the House, "The Report on 
the Public Credit." Hamilton understood that the easiest option would be to follow the 
course taken by many pre- war state governments-simple repudiation of all or part of the 
public debt. Yet Hamilton also knew the ramifications: "States, like individuals, who 
observe their engagements, are respected and trusted, while the reverse is the fate of 
those who pursue an opposite conduct." 34 It was clear to Hamilton that the government 
would have to again appeal to those who held capital in the future for further loans; if 
the government has built a reputation as one which repudiates its debts, capital-holders 
would be reluctant to lend to the government and would do so only at high interest rates. 
Therefore repudiation was not a viable option. 
The second question Hamilton faced was whether the payment plan should distinguish 
between the original holders of the public debt or the subsequent purchasers. Hamilton 
rejected any type of discrimination between original holders and subsequent purchasers 
of public debt, again on contractual grounds: 
The nature of the contract, in its origins, is, that the public will pay the 
sum expressed in the security, to the first holder or his assignee. The intent 
in making the security assignable, is, that the proprietor may be able to 
make use of his property, by selling it for as much as it may be worth in 
the market, and that the buyer may be safe in the purchase. Every buyer, 
therefore, stands exactly in the place of the seller.35 
Further, allowing discrimination between original holder and purchaser would eliminate 
the use of the various forms of public debt as a medium or exchange; such a move would 
have destroyed all types of legal tender then circulating throughout the nation.36 
34Hamilton, V.3, p. 3. 
35Hamilton, V.3, p. 8. 
36Nettles, p. 1 1 2. 
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Hamilton also rejected the idea that the states should pay the public debt. He rec­
ommended that the national government should service not only the debt outstanding to 
individual creditors, but that the national government should assume the debts incurred 
by the states. All of these debts were contracted for one reason- "It was the price of 
liberty " 37 -and he felt the national government should be responsible for financing that 
common goal. Also, the national government could more easily service these debts since 
the states had sharply varying abilities to provide for the public debts they held. 
Perhaps most importantly, a centralized debt service would strengthen the national 
government: 
If all the public creditors receive their due, from one source, distributed 
with an equal hand, their interest will be the same. And, having the same 
interests, they will unite in the support of the fiscal arrangements of the 
Government-as these, too, can be made with more convenience where there 
is no competition. 38 
After he had shown that the national government should be responsible for the entire 
public debt, and that there should be no discrimination between holders (past or present) , 
Hamilton turned his attention to the means by which the debt would be serviced. He 
calculated the entire public debt to total $79 million dollars, on which the interest per 
year would amount to $4.5 million dollars. The question which Hamilton faced was 
whether the revenues of the national government could meet this annual interest payment 
and pay off a certain percentage of the principal each year. 39 Hamilton concluded that 
the government could not fund the entire debt at its current interest rate since this 
would require an extension of direct taxes greater than the House or the people would 
approve. Also, he believed that if the public credit were adequately funded the future 
rate of interest would fall. Therefore Hamilton proposed that the government convert 
the present debt to a lower rate of interest by allowing creditors to exchange their current 
securities for newer low interest securities. The new securities would compensate their 
bearers for the reduced interest return in two different ways. First they guaranteed that 
a certain percentage of their security would be paid in full on an annual basis over an 
extended period of time similar to what we today call annuities) . Second they allowed 
redemption of a portion of the security in the form of Western land. This was the most 
important and subtle part of Hamilton's plan, since by this method of supporting the 
debt, the national government could literally force the interest rate to fall and stabilize. 
This would eliminate the fluctuations in interest rates which fueled the drive toward 
speculation. Jn ,addition, this would play agains�t th�,public's.hatrnd of speGulation and 
solidify popular support behind his plan. Note that Hamilton framed the program as an 
annual appropriation to slowly pay portions of the debt across time, rather than pay the 
entire debt in one gigantic sum. 4 0  
37Hamilton, V. 3, p. 4. 
38Hamilton, V. 3, p. 14. 
39Hamilton, V. 3, pp. 19-21 .  
40McDonald, pp. 166-167. 
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Now all Hamilton had to do was tie up a few loose ends. On the foreign debt, 
he proposed that another loan be taken out abroad to pay only the interest on the 
existing foreign loans and not the principal. He believed that future loans could pay off 
the principal when it came due since scarce cash should not be sent abroad to service 
foreign debts. Second, the state debts should be assumed immediately, but neither the 
interest nor the principal should be paid for at least another year. Hamilton wished to 
give the national government breathing room to slowly and incrementally raise direct 
taxes.4 1 Third, Hamilton proposed to increase revenues through increased duties on 
wines, spirits, teas, and coffees: "They are all of them in reality luxuries; the greatest part 
of them foreign luxuries; some of them, in the excess in which they are used, pernicious 
luxuries." 4 2  These increased duties would net an additional $1.7 million dollars per year 
which would be utilized to pay interest on the public debt. Last, Hamilton proposed 
to create a "sinking fund" with surplus revenues from the Post Office. A board of 
commissioners would be appointed to oversee this "sinking fund " and they would buy 
public securities in the market or buy back portions of the outstanding principal. The 
"sinking fund " would not independently retire a significant portion of the public debt; 
rather, it would buy public securities to maintain them at their face (or par) value. 
The more important purpose of the sinking fund would be what, in the twen­
tieth century, would be known as "pegging the market " or "open market 
operations, " designed to drive the market price of securities to par and main­
tain it at that level. With securities stabilized at par, speculation would 
be ended, public credit would be established, and the public debt would be 
monetized. 4 3  
The major aspects of the Report on Public Credit-assumption, funding, and the sink­
ing fund-constituted most of the business before the First Congress. But in Hamilton's 
understanding of political economy, these measures were all short-run: the funding plan 
was to buy time for the government so it could slowly increase taxes and the sinking fund 
was to play the role of a national bank until an official bank could be founded. Therefore, 
after the "Report on the Public Credit " established the short-term fiscal policies of the 
national government, Hamilton turned to the establishment of permanent institutions of 
public finance. 
As Congress adjourned from the first two sessions, they instructed Hamilton to pre­
pare an additional report on a national bank and a new set of taxes. The reports which 
Hamilton submitted, to j;he,Second, Cop.gress,detailed,:plans for the creation of a national 
bank, a mint, and a taxation system. These institutions, together with the funding sys­
tem, would be mutually supporting and would stabilize the fiscal environment of the 
national government to reduce risk and uncertainty of investment. 
41 McDonald, p. 170. 
42Hamilton, V. 3, p. 34. 
43McDonald, p. 171. 
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Hamilton's proposal for a national bank listed the advantages of such an institution: 
it would increase the amount of active capital in the economy; it would be a source 
of short-term emergency loans to the government; and it would facilitate the payment 
of taxes. 4 4  This national bank was to be capitalized at $10 million dollars, of which 
Congress would provide $2 million (half in cash, the rest to be borrowed from the bank 
and incrementally paid back) and the remaining $8 million would be offered for public 
subscription. 
In Hamilton's mind, the establishment of this bank would almost immediately sta­
bilize the public debt. The high interest rates on the government bonds (six percent) 
which provided the bank's capital assured that these bonds would be eagerly sought by 
investors, and the government itself would be able to support and maintain the bond 
prices through sinking fund purchases of bonds. The high demand for bonds would in 
turn build expectations concerning the bonds in particular and public credit in general. 
This would establish the government's reputation as a debtor. 
"The Report on the National Bank, " submitted by Hamilton on December 14, 1790, 
was modeled on the Bank of England. This enabled Hamilton to cloak this proposal in 
the economic and business theories of the time: "after an experience of centuries, there 
exists not a question about their utility in the countries in which they nave been so 
long established. Theorists and men of business unite in the acknowledgment of it. " 4 5  
But there was one very important distinction between Hamilton's proposed bank and 
it's English predecessor. The Bank of England was only an instrument of public finance 
since its capital was entirely public debt; Hamilton's bank would not deal in public debt 
but would instead supply a national money supply. 4 6  
This bank, however, needed capital to meet interest payments, which meant that 
additional sources of revenue would have to be found. Hamilton reiterated one of the 
themes of his First Report where he argued for increased import duties, but added that 
there were limits on how high these duties could be raised before they were detrimental to 
business. His new proposal planned to shift the burden of duty collection from a voluntary 
basis to a more coercive system relying on federal officers paid on a commission-basis. 
The last aspect of Hamilton's plan concerned the establishment of a mint. Most of 
the rationale behind the proposed mint was provided by others before Hamilton, but he 
considered a national mint to be an essential addition to his establishment of a stable 
public credit. The mint would provide the currency which the national bank would keep 
in circulation, and this currency would be uniquely American. Further, the mint was 
another . a$11ect of the .. �x;pec;ta ti on ap.d .. nmutati_on-buil{ii11g a�pects �.of .. ijamilton' s plan 
since a stable currency based on precious metals would provide a reliable and sound 
medium of exchange. 
Through these short- and long-term proposals, Hamilton sought to create institutions 
44Hamilton, V. 3, pp. 109-1 12. 
45Hamilton, V. 3, p. 107. 
46McDonald, p. 194. 
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which would provide a firm and lasting foundation for public credit in the United States. 
The short-term solutions- assumption of state debts, no discrimination among holders, 
and this institutionalization of the sinking fund-all were expressly designed to face the 
immediate economic crisis, to stabilize interest rates, to slow inflation, and to restore 
public confidence in the ability of the new government to operate in a credible fashion 
concerning the economy and the public debt. Those separate short-run actions were 
mutually dependent upon each other. Immediate and dramatic steps were necessary to 
pull the nation out of economic crisis and that was the purpose of the sinking fund and 
assumption plans. But Hamilton understood that "ultimately, the only way to establish 
public credit was in the marketplace, and the marketplace dealt in beliefs as well as 
facts." 4 7  Therefore the establishment of public confidence in the government's actions 
concerning the national debt was critical. 
Till this shall be accomplished, the finances of the United States will never 
wear a proper countenance .... In nothing are appearances of greater moment 
that in whatever regards credit. Opinion is the soul of it; and this is effected 
by appearances as well as realities.4 8 
The establishment of a sound foundation for funding the public debt was critical in the 
short-term for solving the economic crisis and for institutionalizing public confidence in 
the government and the economy. Furthermore, public confidence was essential for the 
debt funding and the consequent reduction of inflation and interest rates. 
The short-run institutionalization of public confidence and the public debt were in­
sufficient for the permanent foundation Hamilton wished to construct for the economy 
and the national government. He -proposed long-run political-economic institutions: 
the establishment of a mint, a revision of the tax system, and the creation 
of a national bank. Properly rigged, each would support the others and the 
funding system as well, and the funding system in turn would support them 
all. Opinion would remain the heart and the life's blood of the whole, but 
opinion would now be institutionalized; and opinion, firmly institutionalized, 
becomes well-nigh unalterable.4 9 
The main element of the institutionalization "of public credit and public confidence was 
the new nationar'barik." Hamiltbn's n:a:tionafba:nk prdposa'l'highligbts 'the intersection 
between his political and economic writings, and for that reason I will turn now to a 
discussion of the national bank and its political-economic ramifications before discussing 
the general outline of Hamilton's political economic thought. 
47McDonald, p. 164. 
48Hamilton, V. 3, p. 31; McDonald, p. 164. 
49McDonald, p. 190. 
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3 The National Bank 
Hamilton meant the sinking fund to be a short-run instrument with which the national 
government would control the public debt until a permanent national bank were estab­
lished. He stated in his first "Report on the Public Credit: " 
He ardently wished to see incorporated, as a fundamental maxim, in the 
system of public credit of the United States, that the creation of debt should 
always be accompanied with the means of extinguishment. This he regards as 
the true secret for rendering public credit immortal ... the Secretary proposes 
that the net product of the Post Office ... be applied ... to the discharge of the 
existing public debt .... As an additional expedient for effecting a reduction 
of the debt, and for other purposes, which will be mentioned, the Secretary 
would further propose ... a National Bank. 5 0  
The bank proposed by Hamilton would originally have only $500,000 in capital. Its 
eventual capital stock would not exceed $10 million: $1.5 million held by the government 
and $8 million held by shareholders. The shares would be sold in four hundred dollar 
chunks, of which the buyer would have to pay one-fourth in gold or silver coin and 
three-fourths in 6then, was supported in turn by sinking fund operations. 
Once the capital stock of the bank was sold the price of the public debt and its rate of 
interest would stabilize. Investors who held portions of the public debt, attracted by the 
prospect of the almost certain profitability of the national bank, would rush to sell public 
debt to the bank in return for bank stock. This would bid the price of the public debt 
up, while sinking fund intervention would maintain a stable interest rate. Quickly the 
national bank would become the principle bearer of public debt, which would virtually 
eliminate speculatory buying and selling of public debt in the capital markets. 
While Hamilton no longer believed that the national bank could use the public debt 
as currency, he did see that the public debt held by the national bank would serve as a 
foundation for new national currency: 
His original idea had been to monetize the public debt, in the doing of which 
a national bank would be indispensable .... But all such thinking became 
obsolete when it was decided that the new certificates of public debt would 
bear tbree differeiil rates oI interest; they 6bv1ous1J" contd not be pegged at 
the same price, and thus the idea of transforming them directly into money 
was impractical. 5 1  
50Hamilton, V. 3, pp. 41-43. 
51 McDonald, pp. 192-193. 
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Also, these operations by the national bank would stabilize and reduce interest rates not 
through the coercive influence of laws, but by the national bank's manipulation of the 
money supply: "Banks are among the means most proper to accomplish this end; and 
the moderation of the rate at which their discounts are made, is a material ingredient 
towards it." 5 2  
In the short-run, the new national bank would quickly become the major holder of 
the public debt. Also, the prices of the public debt would increase and the interest rates 
on the public debt certificates would stabilize through bank capitalization. Moreover, 
the possession by the bank of this majority share of public debt certificates would serve 
as the foundation for a new national. currency system, in a nation with insufficient gold 
and silver reserves to back a metal-based currency system. Finally, the interest rates 
throughout the nation on loans and debts would be reduced and stabilized: "the natural 
effect of low interest is to increase trade and industry; because undertakings of every 
kind can be prosecuted with greater advantage." 5 3  
The national bank would also serve important long-run purposes. It would increase 
commerce and governmental revenues. Obviously, more currency in circulation would fuel 
economic expansion. But, currency in circulation would also serve to further increase the 
productive capital stock of the nation. Hamilton noted: 
His money, thus deposited or invested, is a fund upon which himself and 
others can borrow to a much larger amount. It is a well-established fact, that 
banks in good credit can circulate a far greater sum than the actual quantum 
of their capital in gold and silver. 5 4  
Currency, saved in a deposit by one individual formed the basis for capital loans to other 
individuals,-which reinvested elsewhere in the national economy, further spurred profit, 
savings, and investment. Only with the foundation of a national bank-with a strong and 
stable national currency, with low and steady interest rates, and with deposit and loan 
capabilities-could this profit-savings-investment dynamic be initiated. 
This national bank would also facilitate the collection and expansion of government 
revenues. With a strong, stable, and circulating national currency, taxes could efficiently 
and quickly be gathered, and the national government would have a place to deposit 
and draw upon its revenues. But with the institution of the profit-savings-investment 
dynamic, and the consequent increase in commerce and industry, the tax base of the 
national governlilent wquld ex:pand, 
Also in the long-term, the national government would have resources for future un­
foreseen contingencies, especially those which would require unknown governmental ex­
penditures. The national bank would be a source of short-term loans for the national 
52Hamilton, V.3, p. 144. 
53Hamilton, V. 3, pp. 143-144. 
54Hamilton, V. 3, p. 108. 
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government in times of war or other sudden emergencies. This alternative would alleviate 
most of the pressure on the government in such situations to resort to pre-Constitutional 
sources of revenues-printing money, selling bonds, or taking foreign loans. Thus the 
national bank would help maintain national security in face of sudden contingencies. 
Another long-term result of a single national bank was an increase in public support 
for the new national government. Hamilton noted: 
If all the public creditors receive their dues from one source, distributed with 
an equal hand, their interest will be the same. And, having the same interest, 
they will unite in the support of the fiscal arrangements of the Government. 5 5  
With the national bank buying and holding the public debt, issuing national currency, 
and supporting the financial foundation of the new republic, Hamilton believed that the 
interests of the populace would be steadily wedded to both the national bank and the 
national government. 
With public support for the bank and government would come two other essential 
ties between individuals and the new republic. First, the faith of the people in the public 
credit would be restored and maintained through the institution of the national bank. 
No longer would the national government need to use economically harmful means to 
gather revenues in future emergencies. But if the future emergencies shifted to long-term 
financial needs (for example, long- drawn wars) , then the populace would be assured that 
the operations of the national bank would avoid the type of financial crisis which existed 
after the end of the Revolutionary War. 
Second, the government's reputation as a creditor would be enhanced. Investors and 
capital-holders would know that even in the face of past financial crisis the government 
had not repudiated its war debts, and had taken the best possible steps to pay back its 
creditors. This would increase individual willingness to lend money to the government in 
the future with low rates of interest. Thus, the institutionalization of the national bank 
would maintain government credibility and reputation regarding its debts. 
In all these ways the national bank would in the short- and long-run serve to strengthen 
the role and power of the new national government. With the institutionalization of the 
national bank, the government would insinuate itself into the very foundation of the na­
tional economy, by providing stable interest rates, currency, and economic expectations. 
The gover:nme-nt ·<WGuJd ..also .. drnmatiGally- ,j;nc;r-e.a,se its ·OWJa..,, fi,:nanci.aL,resources with more 
efficient revenue collection, stimulation of economic activity, and with an assured pool of 
capital . Last, the government would through individual self-interest begin to bind the 
people of the nation to the national government. 
55Hamilton, V. 3, p. 154. 
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4 The Attack on the Bank 
The first legislative phase of Hamilton's plan passed the House intact. Yet in the second 
session of the First Congress, there was growing opposition to Hamilton personally and 
to various aspects of his plan. When the House reconvened in late fall 1790, Hamilton 
submitted the long-term aspects of his financial plans to the House for consideration. 
While the least controversial proposal-the establishment of a mint-was passed into law 
with little opposition, the excise and bank proposals did rouse opposition. A solid bloc 
of southerners were arrayed against Hamilton's proposals for increased commodity taxes, 
but since the opposition leader, Madison, was indifferent over the excise bill, it was passed 
over the Southerner's objections. 
The bank proposal was another story. In the House, there were several dimensions to 
the bank's opposition: Madison's desire to stop the "Federalist " steamroller; opposition 
to the bank's location in Philadelphia; and concern over Congressional creation of a quasi­
private corporate institution. But mainly, 
the Virginians fear( ed) that once the bank became firmly entrenched in Philadel­
phia, it would be almost impossible to move the capital a decade later .... As 
part of his maneuvering, (Madison) warned the Pennsylvanians that if they 
failed to cooperate, he would attack the bill in the House as unconstitutional 
.... Rebuffed, Madison make good his threat. In long speeches delivered in 
February 2 and 8, he maintained that Congress had no power to charter a 
corporation. 5 6  
While the House passed the bank proposal over Madison's constitutional objection 39 to 
20, President Washington became concerned that the constitutional consensus established 
by the ratification was in danger. 
Therefore, Washington asked members of his cabinet to prepare briefs discussing 
Madison's argument against the bank. Randolph, the Attorney General (also a Vir­
ginian), informed Washington that in his opinion the bank bill was unconstitutional. 
Jefferson seconded Randolph's opinion only a few days later, along with a lengthy brief 
describing other laws the bank bill supposedly violated. Washington forwarded Randolph 
and Jefferson's briefs to Hamilton so that he could formulate a reply. 
Hamilton quickly went to the heart of the issue in his "Opinion as to the Consti­
tutionality of the Bank of the United State.s." He saw "the objections of the Secretary 
of State and Attorney-General are founded on a general denial of the authority of the 
United States to erect corporations." 5 7  But, Hamilton firmly believed "that principles of 
construction like those espoused by the Secretary of State and Attorney-General, would 
be fatal to the just and indispensable authority of the United States." 5 8 
56McDonald, p. 201 .  
57Hamilton, V .  4,  p. 105. 
58Hamilton, V. 4, p. 104. 
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Hamilton noted that a sovereign power can establish corporations, the only question 
being which corporations it has the authority to construct. In Hamilton's view, this 
sovereign authority to create corporations extended to all "the objects intrusted to the 
management of government." 5 9  The constitutional objection to the bank stated, however, 
that the power to charter a national bank was not a power expressly included among the 
powers granted to the national government in the Constitution; hence, the power to 
create banks must rest with the people or the states. 
There was no doubt in Hamilton's mind that the power to establish a national bank 
was not expressly granted in the Constitution. But he argued, there are three types of 
power-express, implied, and resulting. The latter, resulting powers, Hamilton described 
with an example . If, the United States conquered neighboring territory, it would acquire 
sovereignty over the conquered territory not from the express clauses in the Constitution, 
but from the de facto possession of the land. "This would be rather a result, from the 
whole mass of the powers of the government, and from the nature of political society, 
than a consequence of either of the powers specially enumerated." 6 0  
Implied powers were very similar to resulting powers. Power to establish a corpora­
tion, argued Hamilton, would be implied if that corporation were a necessary means or 
instrument to carry out one of the expressly-stated powers in the Constitution. Again 
arguing from example, Hamilton wrote: 
Thus a corporation may not be erected by Congress for superintending the 
police of the city of Philadelphia, because they are not authorized to regulate 
the police of that city. But one may be erected in relation to the collection 
of taxes, or to the trade with foreign countries ... because it is the province 
of the federal government to regulate those objects.6 1 
Since the Constitution expressly granted the national government the power to collect 
taxes and duties, to pay the national debt, to provide for common defense, to borrow, 
coin, and regulate the value of money, and last to provide for the common welfare, 
Hamilton reasoned that the government had the implied power to create a national bank 
to achieve these expressly-granted powers . 
Hamilton then extended this discussion of implied powers very broadly, beyond the 
establishment of the national bank: it encompassed all expressly-given powers, and hence 
dramatically increased the authority of the government to establish laws and institutions 
concerning a multitude ,of .. objects .not .. discussed in .the .,Gonstitu ti on . 
If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and 
if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by 
59Hamilton, V. 4, p. 106. 
60Hamilton, V. 4, p. 107. 
61 Hamilton, V. 4, p. 108. 
21 
any particular provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come 
within the compass of the national authority.6 2 
Washington, impressed with Hamilton's brief, signed the bank bill into law ; after that 
stroke of a pen, Hamilton's financial plan was established. The national government 
would thereafter play a fundamental role in the economic development of the United 
States. 
5 Hamilton's Political Economy 
In this discussion of Hamilton's political and economic thoughts and actions, it is clear­
that both are interconnected in the bank proposal. The national bank, created as an 
institution of the national government, would play both political and economic roles. 
First, it would wed individual interest with the development of the new national govern­
ment. Second, it would increase public confidence in the new government, and develop 
in the populace a feeling that the national government is useful and necessary. Third, 
the national bank would play critical short- and long-term economic roles promoting 
economic development of the nation. Furthermore, with his constitutional defense of the 
national bank, he established a persuasive constitutional interpretation principle-implied 
power- which dramatically broadened the range of activities which the national govern­
ment could involve itself. Last, the national bank would serve to generally strengthen 
the powers of the government, especially in relation to economic policymaking. 
To conclude, there are two very broad themes which occur repeatedly throughout 
Hamilton's writings. First, he was deeply committed to the development of a strong na­
tional government which was armed with the requisite powers to exercise its sovereignty. 
He firmly believed that the solution to the political and economic troubles of the pre­
Constitutional states would be found in a strong, centralized government . Second, Hamil­
ton was expressly dedicated to developing institutions within the governmental structure 
which were strong, stable, and permanent. These institutions would influence and mold 
individual opinion and interest to support the national government in the long-run. And 
only the institutionalization of individual support would ensure the eventual stability 
and strength of the central government. 
62Hamilton, V. 4, p. 1 13. 
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